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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, MARCH 8, 1985
It should be obvious also that Moscow has every incentive to keep the pres
sure on the U.S. in Central America. It sees renewed hope for one of its
most sought-after objectives: the removal of U.S. ground forces from
Western Europe. Only after this occurs can the process of confederating
the nations of Western and Eastern Europe begin.
In the February 8, 1985 WALL STREET JOURNAL, John R. Silber, president of
Boston University, wrote an opinion piece entitled "Plain Talk Behind
Closed Doors in Central America." Dr. Silber was a member of the Kissinger
Commission, which drafted recommendations regarding the war-ravaged region.
Dr. Silber said that the Sandinistas distort history, as all communists do,
to justify their need for massive arms to defend the revolution. He also
divulged the fears that most of the other leaders of the region have but are
afraid to speak of openly. Nicaragua's growing might intimidates them, and
nowhere is there absolute confidence that the U.S. presents an effective
counterforce. Excerpts of Dr. Silber's article follow.
The U.S. did not force the Sandinistas into their military build
up. The U.S. did not encourage the Sandinistas to censor the
press, install block committees·, forbid free labor unions, im
prison and harass their opposition and ultimately hold a sham
election. We in the U.S. should·not reproach ourselves for forc
ing the Sandinistas into Marxism and militarism--for we did not.
Our error was in failing to perceive that after the revolution
the Leninist Sandinistas who had the guns would set up a dicta
torship and blame their betrayal of the revolution on us••••
Many citizens of the U.s. are still reluctant to accept the
realities of the situation.
Central Americans, on the other
hand, are acutely aware of the threat on their doorsteps. When
members of the Kissinger Commission met in private with high
ranking civilian leaders in Central America, we were told of
their deep concern over the military buildup in Nicaragua and the
massive Soviet-Cuban presence there. Without exception, these
leaders agreed that the government of Nicaragua is determined to
export revolution••••
In Panama, the leaders made it clear to us that the Panama Canal
may well be under attack within three or four yea""rs'if nothing is
done to contain the situation in Nicaragua. Yet publicly, the
leaders of Panama have been reluctant to speak of such a possi
bility. Costa Rican leaders, both of the ruling National Libera
tion Party and of the major opposition party, have spoken of
economic and political subversion caused by Nicaraguan infiltra
tors in Costa Rica, of an international Sandinista propaganda
campaign against Costa Rica, and of the inability of the Costa
Ricans to match Nicaraguan military might in order to defend
their country from Sandinista adventurism. Yet these leaders,
too, have been reluctant to speak frankly about their concerns in
public.
President Suazo Cordova of Honduras spoke with the Kissinger Com
mission of the necessity of supporting El Salvador and of the
threat to his country from Nicaragua. He has, since that time,