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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, JANUARY 11, 1985
them from the Soviet yoke. That longing explains the extraordin
ary standing to this day in Eastern Europe of de Gaulle--simply
because he raised the standard of "Europe to the Urals." It ex
plains also the special appeal of the Pope, whose vision of Eu
rope's spiritual unity has obvious political implications. But
the East Europeans will settle for half a loaf if they cannot
have the whole. Faced with the choice of exclusive Soviet domin
ation, only occasionally contested by American policy, or of at
least growing ties with even a politically weak Western Europe,
the East Europeans clearly prefer the latter•••.
As President Mitterrand put it .some two years ago, "tout� qui
permettera de sortir de Yalta � bon ••••" But how to escape
from Yalta?••• This third option [of a politically more vital Eu
rope] requires a long-term strategy•••• The point of departure
.•.has to be joint recognition of the important conclusion which
the experience of the last several decades teaches: the historic
balance in Europe will be changed gradually in the West's favor
only if Russia comes to be faced west of the Elbe rather less by
America and rather more by Europe••••
Undoing the division of Europe, which is so essential to its
spiritual and moral recovery, is a goal worthy of the Western
democracies and one capable of galvanizing a shared sense of
historic purpose.••• First, on the symbolic plane, it would be
appropriate for the heads of the democratic West as a whole,
perhaps on February 4, 1985, to clarify jointly, through a solemn
declaration, the West's attitude toward the historic legacy of
Yalta•••• The West should underline its commitment to a restored
Europe, free of extra-European control. It should stress its be
lief that there� exists� genuine European political identity,
the heir to Europe's civilization, which is entitled to unfet
tered expression. It should affirm the right of every European
nation to choose its sociopolitical system in keeping with its
history and tradition•••• Finally, by drawing attention to the
positive experience of neutral Austria and Finland, it should
pledge that�� authentic Europe would not entail the exten
sion of the American sphere of influence to the European state
frontiers of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, reaffirmation of the continued Western commitment to
the Helsinki Final Act c;::ould help to resolve the potentially
fatal European ambivalence regarding Germany. The fact is that,
while the Europeans resent their historic partition, they fear
almost� much� reunited Germany. Therefore, the renunciation
of Yalta's legacy--the division of Europe--should be accompanied
by an explicit pledge•••that the purpose of healing the East-West
rift in Europe is not to dismantle any existing state but to give
every European people the opportunity to participate fully in
wider all-European cooperation. In that context, the division of
Germany need not be undone through formal reunification but by
the gradual emergence of� much less threatening loose confedera
tion of the existing two states••••
If Europe is to emerge politically, it must assume a more direct
role in its own defense•••• To move Europe in this direction, the