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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, JUNE 15, 1984
PAGE 9
their shoulders at political events in their home countries. What they
committed themselves to, or refused to commit themselves to, was basically
influenced not by the larger good of the world economy, but what was con
sidered acceptable to their own voting publics.
All of U.S. President Ronald Reagan's counterparts were known to be con
cerned about the continuation of high deficits and high interest rates in
the U.S. economy which, they claimed, puts a drag on the world economy. For
his part Mr. Reagan was eager to avoid specific references to these points.
It is significant that when the summit's final communique on the world
economy was produced, uncomfortable direct references to the U.S. deficit,
present in the initial drafts of the paper, were deleted. The widespread
feeling is that no other Western leader wanted to harm Mr. Reagan's re
election chances. Despite
any criticisms they
had of Mr.
Reagan,
it ap
pears they would rather deal with him than anyone the Democratic Party
would select.
World Indebtedness
The seven leaders (plus the president of the commission of the European
Community) tiptoed around two of the world's most serious crises. First of
all, the war raging between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and second,
the burgeoning indebtedness of Third World countries. The leaders were
clearly playing for time. Because there are huge oil stocks in the major
Western countries, the leaders were able to get away with only a weak call
upon Iran and Iraq to "cease the attacks on each other and the shipping of
other states." The urgency to do more was clearly missing.
Regarding the multibillion dollar indebtedness of Argentina, Mexico, Brazil
and a host of other nations, the summit leaders merely proposed to encour
age commercial banks and governments to renegotiate loans, changing them
from the present year-by-year review to multiple-year rescheduling. If the
summit proposal is adopted by the world's big lending institutions, the net
effect will be to once again buy more time before major defaults in the
world's interlocking economic structure occur. There are indications that
major banks are being arm-twisted to go along with the proposal.
Reagan-Thatcher Relationship
This summit, as in previous meetings, provided the opportunity for the as
sembled leaders to engage in what are called "bilateral" meetings--separate
meetings between two individuals.
Certainly a very important bilateral meeting was the one between Mr. Rea
gan and Mrs. Thatcher. They met privately three days before the summit be
gan. Their conference lasted almost an hour longer than scheduled. A Pres
idential aide who sat in on the meeting said it was the most stimulating
high-level private talk he had heard in 15 years. The real reason why this
close harmony exists was partially provided by Mr. Reagan the day he left
London after the summit was over. In his departing speech the President re
ferred warmly to Americans and Britons as kindred peoples--which the Church
of course knows they are.
The June 8 issue of the FINANCIAL TIMES of London contained some inter
esting thoughts about what it said was the "cozy relationship" between Mr.
Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher.