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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, DECEMBER 16, 1983
European countries. � West European defense organization could
offset any strategic advantage the Soviet Union and its allies
might accrue from the withdrawal of American nuclear and conven­
tional forces across the Atlantic while Soviet forces remained on
the continent, albeit within their national borders. The defense
organization would have at its disposal the world's most modern
conventional weapons s � stems--also of U.S. origin--as well as the
second-strike capability of the French-British nuclear forces.
These forces would be built up and integrated into a West
European defense organization....
"Finlandizing" All of Eastern Europe
Any new move toward European autonomy would, of course, also
require military adjustments within Eastern Europe. No Soviet
troops could remain in Eastern Europe.••. The April 1948 Soviet­
Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance,
based on the following articles, could provide the formula for
such treaties: Article 1: In the eventuality of Finland, or the
Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an
armed attack by Germany or any state allied with the latter
.,
Finland will, true to its obligations as an independent state,
fight to repel the attack.... Article 6: The High Contracting
Parties pledge themselves to observe the principle of the mutual
respect of sovereignty and integrity and that of noninterference
in the internal affairs of the other state.
A liberated Europe would require not only reorganizing both the
Warsaw Pact and NATO, but also consolidating the political and
territorial situation in the German region. The resolution of
the German problem requires a Soviet pledge to change fundamen­
tally its European policy by guaranteeing its allies the right to
self-determination.
The great majority of Germans--East and
West--would accept the existence of two states in their homeland
if a peace treaty between both the four former occupation powers
and the two German states insured that the German Democratic Re­
public (GDR) emerged with a democratic-pluralistic social order.
The GDR--enjoying a status similar to that of Finland--would be
obligated to support Soviet foreign policy actively and to coop­
erate with the Soviet Union economically•...
Such an agreement would be in line with the general West German
policy of "freedom before unity" and would not differ from the
present status--the existence of two sovereign German states..•.
In 1958 then Chancellor Adenauer proposed that the Soviet Union
grant the GDR status similar to that of [ free and neutral]
Austria.... Social Democratic Party Chairman Willy Brandt stated
recently before American journalists in Bonn that the future of a
divided Germany was not necessarily in the restoration of a na­
tional state. And Kohl spoke in Washington before U.S. colum­
nists of his efforts "to bring the problem of Germany under a
European roof."...
Such a treaty.•.would create for the first time the psychological
preconditions for the FRG [the Federal Republic, or West Germany]
to enter into political union with its Western neighbors as well