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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, DECEMBER 16, 1983
They may do so on a national or on a European basis. But these
decisions cannot be American decisions. In effect the Germans
will have to�� much greater role in their own defense than
they have so far played, and so will the Japanese.
In a rather surprising article in Britain's SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (November 13,
1983), entitled "Unasked Questions About Peace," chief foreign affairs ana
lyst Peregrine Worsthorne, normally quite hawkish and pro-American, pon
dered whether now might be the time for Western Europe to consider "an early
divorce" from the U.S. and to instead "reach an understanding" with the
Soviet Union.
It might be of help to try to clarify some of the recent develop
ments revolutionizing Britain's and Western Europe's attitudes to
foreign affairs, of which the most important--but least clearly
recognized--is a reduction in fear of the Soviet Union.
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Whereas in the late 1940s and sos it really did seem likely that
the Soviet Union would wish to do to Western Europe what it was
doing to Eastern Europe--i.e., send the Red Army in to impose
Communism--that possibility nowadays seems a bit too far-fetched
to be taken seriously. Has not the Soviet empire enough troubles
holding down Eastern Europe by force without trying to include
additional vast areas of potential disaffection?
In any case,
would not a Soviet invasion of Western Europe provide Eastern
Europe with an opportunity to try to throw off the Russian yoke?
Only a mad Soviet ruler could conceivably put the Soviet empire
at risk in this way. That was not at all the situation in the
1950s when the Kremlin might well have dreamt about Western
Europe being as ripe for Communism as was, at that time, Eastern
Europe.••• No longer.
Faith in Communism has almost entirely evaporated. On any ra
tional calculation, Soviet domination today of Western Europe
would produce far more liabilities for the Kremlin than assets.
Even without American thermonuclear protection, Britain and
Western Europe have little to fear directly from the Soviet
Union. In other words, the original motive behind the formation
of NATO--to prevent the Red Army imposing Communism on Western
Europe--no longer applies. Of course the Soviet influence over
Western Europe would increase if the American defensive commit
ment was weakened, but not to any horrendous degree.
What people are beginning to realize is that the Soviet threat is
now aimed primarily at other parts of the world--namely the
Middle East and Latin America--and given a minimum of prudence
and resolute statesmanship on the part of Britain and Western
Europe, that is how it could remain.
!!
really might be possible
for Western Europe and the Soviet Union to establish some kind of
modus vivendi acceptable to both. In return for them leaving us
alone in Western Europe, we would have to leave them alone in the
rest of the world.
Needless to say, any such bargain, either explicit � im
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1i 9 it,
would seriously affect Britain's and Western Europe s re at1ons