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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, JULY 29, 1983
PAGE 10
reached with North Vietnam in early 1973.
South Vietnam, bereft of U.S.
aid, collapsed in early 1975. The years since then have witnessed a steady
erosion in U.S. willpower and prestige.
Now, once again, during the first week in August, nineteen years after the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the U.S. is moving into another war situation.
And,
as
in Vietnam, it is approaching this new war with hesitation, uncer
tainty, and with the lack of a solid game plan. The conflict between Presi
dent Reagan and the Congress {especially the House) over the funding of
anti-Sandinista
'
'contras" is a perfect example of such confusion over U.S.
goals in Central America.
The President is trying to overcome Congressional and public anxiety with
the appointment of a bi-partisan twelve man commission, headed by Dr. Henry
Kissinger, to help shape a long-term national consensus on Central American
policy.
At the same time, as in Vietnam, the U.S. is "inching in" mili
tarily--a sure recipe for failure.
Reported the LOS ANGELES TIMES in its
July 28 edition:
Despite the President's rejection of a Vietnam analogy, a July 8
working paper of his National Security Council, which provided
the basis for much of this increased activity, admitted that "an
incremental escalation" of military activity and economic aid for
Central America could suggest "an awkward parallel with Viet
nam."
"Deep Misgivings" in Pentagon
Some top Pentagon brass, as mentioned earlier, are said to be worried that
the public does not understand the need for the action and that, conse
quently U.S. efforts could fail as in Vietnam. Here is a report in the July
27, 1983 LOS ANGELES TIMES:
WASHINGTON--President Reagan's decision to order massive U.S.
military maneuvers in Central America and to seek more funds for
covert operations against Nicaragua was made despite deep mis
givings by some of the nation's senior military officials about
the ultimate costs and consequences.
Uncertain about precisely
what the President's decisions are intended to accomplish, these
officers fear that a Vietnam-like situation eventually could
develop in which American forces would become involved in the
Central American conflict but would not have the tools, the
operating freedom or the public support necessary for success.
Without clearl y stated goals and adequate means for achieving
them, some officers said, the armed forces could lose the hard
won gains in public esteem they have achieved since the dark days
of Vietnam....
"If I knew exactly what we were going to do down
there, I'd feel a whole lot better," said one ranking Marine
officer who asked not to be identified.
"If I don't understand
it, how is Joe Sixpack going to understand it? What we don't want
is to find ourselves out on a limb again," he added, recalling
the lack of pub!ic support for U.S. troops during the Vietnam
War.
While the degree of apprehension varies among individuals, high
ranking officers interviewed evoked the image of Vietnam to