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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, JUNE 3, 1983
PAGE 10
At the Center of Strategic and International Studies, defense analyst Mike
Moodie told me that nearly all likely outcomes of the Euromissile deploy
ment program bode ill for the Western Alliance. A less than unanimous de
cision on the part of NATO's sixteen members to proceed with deployment by
December would not sit well with the United States. "An 8-7-1 decision," he
said, hardly would reflect confidence in U.S. alliance leadership. A de
cision to postpone the deployment--advocated by some Europeans--would be
considered even worse.
Without solid European backing, said a German, Manfred Hamm, at the Heri
tage Foundation, the United States would certainly be justified in calling
for the removal of its ground forces from Europe, rather than exposing them
to greater Soviet risk.
At the same time, said Dr. Hamm, the Europeans are deeply concerned that the
intercontinental strategic (U.S. rather than European-based) nuclear weap
ons that protect them are in danger of being "frozen" into disuse because of
the mushrooming "nuclear freeze" movement in the United States. Particu
larly alarming to Europeans is the pro-freeze position recently taken by
America's liberal Roman Catholic bishops. West German and French bishop�
interestingly enough, have publicly stated their opposition to the thrust
of the position of their counterparts in America.
Central American Turmoil
Western Europeans are worried, too, that the United States is becoming
mired in a "new Vietnam" in Central America. Mr. Reagan confirmed their
fears during the summit when he removed two key officials in his Central
America policy structure, replacing them with individuals considered to be
more "hard line."
According to Mr. Moodie, Central America promises to be the most critical
foreign policy issue of the 1984 Presidential campaign. "Over the next
eighteen months," he said, "Central America has the potential to rip us
apart again."
Logically, said fellow CSIS member William Perry, the U.S. should seriously
consider sending its own troops in. It would take probably no more than
25,000 to wipe out the small number of guerrillas in El Salvador. However,
U.S. public opinion just won't permit this. "The real battleground is this
country," Mr. Perry said.
There is a definite domino effect possible in Central America, noted Mr.
Perry, but it doesn't necessarily include Mexico. Mexico would certainly
become more vulnerable should every country below it succumb to Marxist
revolution. But he felt that "to go after Mexico," as he put it, would
require a deliberate decision on the part of Moscow and Havana. Presently,
the leftist sympathies of Mexico serve the latter well.
Should this decision be taken, Mexico could hardly stand up to leftist
revolution. Its small army (half the size of Cuba's) said the outspoken Mr.
Perry, is run by "octogenarian clowns" and Mexico's admirals "have no
boats."
Nevertheless, the government would have to fall back on its
logical pillars of support: The wealthy and the middle classes, the army-
and ultimately the United States. The revolution would have to be
ruthlessly crushed--which means the U.S. would again be accused of being on
the side of an "oppressive regime."