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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, MAY 13, 1983
PAGE 7
coming up with one ingenious, comprehensive plan after another.
They all fail, of course, but nothing, apparently, can stop the
department from germinating new ones.
The Middle East problem, as the State Department sees it, is
mutual hostility and distrust between Israel and its Arab neigh
bors. The solution, therefore, is obvious: a comprehensive set
tlement of outstanding issues that encourages Israelis and Arabs
to live together in peace. This is true enough--only both par
ties also prefer other things to peace, and their preferences at
the moment are utterly irreconcilable.
The Israelis, as a result of successive victories in the 35-
years' war that has been the condition of the Middle East, pos
sess territories they will either never surrender--East Jerusalem
falls into this category--or are reluctant to surrender (e.g.,
the Golan Heights and at least a portion of the West Bank). In
fairness to the Israelis, it must be said that they sought
neither the wars nor the victories. But having achieved those
viGtories, and having endured the sufferings of those wars, they
see no reason why they should be deprived of some of the land they
deem to be of strategic significance to them••.. Most Israelis
.••are convinced that...the Arabs will never truly surrender
their dream of total reconquest of Palestine.
The State Department, however,
is
stubbornly convinced that there
Isa latent ''moderate consensus1" in the Arab world, aoothat if
our-diplomacy can only bring this to
the
surface, the Middle East
problem might be solved. This is a topsy-turvy reading of real
ities. The evidence is overwhelming that any such moderate con
sensus isa fleeting, Tntermittent phenomenon that exists only on
the most superficial level of private diplomacy. A ruler like
King Hussein of Jordan, who is moderate enough in private conver
sation, lives atop a volcano, and knows it. What is latent in
Arab popular opinion is a pan-Arab and pan-Islamic fervor which
is always threatening to erupt in anarchic violence.
T �at is why there is no such thing as ! "peace process" in the
Middle East, despite State Department proclamations. Camp oavia
did not inaugurate a peace process. Anwar Sadat did not extend
diplomatic recognition of Israel in exchange for peace.
He
extended it in exchange for the Sinai--a territory that Egyptian
popular opinion cared much about, and which the Israelis were
willing to give up. Even then, the agreement did not save him
from assassination••••
To the extent that the U.S. can act as honest broker between
Israelis and Arabs, it should. But it will take more than a sec
retary of state, even with the most�ngeTlc--rntentTo�to. �dl
duce an overall seftleiiient.�he age of miracles in the�1
e
East Is long since over.
Monroe Doctrine Out, Brezhnev Doctrine In
The U.S. Congress continues to play its responsibility-ducking game in Cen
tral America--one of disaster on the installment plan. A House committee