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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, JANUARY 14, 1983
PAGE 6
Japan's dynamic new Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone appears to want to
please the United States on the defense spending issue. Of course, there
are factions within his own ruling Liberal Democratic Party that do not
want to see Japan take a more active role militarily in Asia. Nevertheless,
in his first press conference shortly after assuming the office of Prime
Minister last November 26, Nakasone said, "I believe that our country's
defense efforts have not been adequate. And I understand the argument put
forward by the U.S. and its European allies that Japan should increase its
military spending now that it has become a great economic power."
Mr. Nakasone does have considerable support from within the LDP for a
militarily stronger Japan. Last spring, at about the time that Defense
Secretary Casper Weinberger visited Japan to urge a big increase in mili
tary spending, several hundred prominent Japanese, including 58 members of
parliament, demanded a revision of the Japanese-u.s. security treaty, which
goes back to 1952 (and amended somewhat in 1960).
Declaring that the treaty represented a "stain on our national pride," the
group maintained that it was "inexcusable for Japan to continue to rely on
the United States," and called for a vast expansion of military forces.
Some members urged that the no-war clause in the constitution be elimin
ated, and even broached the ultimate taboo by suggesting that Japan acquire
nuclear weapons.
Down through the years, Mr. Nakasone, while no militarist, has repeatedly
said that Japan's u.s.-composed post-war constitution should be changed in
order to give legitimacy to the .military forces Japan alr�ady has. Article
Nine of the constitution states that "Japan will never maintain land, sea
and air forces, as well as other potential forces for war." This, of
course, is totally out of date, Japan long having possessed land, sea and
air "self-defense" forces. In fact, Japan already is the world's eighth
ranked military power.
Thus, by force of events, due to the fact that the U.S. is a power in de
cline and Japan is still on the way up, a change in the power relationship
between the U.S. and Japan and between Japan and its Asian neighbors seems
inevitable. But there is, notes Ronald Steel, a "political price to pay"
for the change America seems to want. In the December 16, 1982 INTERNATION
AL HERALD TRIBUNE, Steel writes:
American taxpayers have every reason to ask why, 37 years after
the end of the war, they are still paying for the defense of a
country that is their greatest economic challenger and obviously
has the means to pay its military bills. All this makes economic
sense.
But there is � political price to �--one which American
officials are curiously unaware of. If Japan starts rearming in
a big way, it will not let its diplomacy be made in Washington.
It will start making its political and military influence felt
throughout Asia, as most Asians fear, and will be far less will
ing to take its cues from Washington. It means the end of the
kind of relationship America has had with Japan siric"e 1945-:-
This is the price for pushing Japan to rearm. It may be an un
avoidable price, for the alternative is a continued military