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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, MAY 28, 1982
PAGE 12
ship-builders to the principal buyers of these kind of ships--Third World
admirals. These customers wanted a lighter super-structure to support all
the "top weight" they demanded, meaning highly visible weapons systems on
deck, rather than invisible electronics below deck. They were primarily
interested in showing off fire power to neighboring countries. In effect,
the British Navy bought these compromised ships as production line "run
ons" rather than customizing them to meet its own needs.
Mr. Preston
continues about the aluminium problem, and concludes by pointing out other
faulty strategy.
The signs that aluminium is an unacceptable fire hazard have, of
course, been plain to see for some time. For example, [in 1977 on
the HMS Amazon] an operations room fire melted ladderways and
bulkheads. It is reported that in some instances the heat-resis
tant paint survived as two outside layers, whereas the aluminium
between had melted. Aluminium's melting point in fact is 660
degrees, compared to steel's 1500 degrees�. If there's a fire,
it therefore just keeps melting, which would never happen with
steel.
If �hat has been a blunder of appalling dimensions, other politi
cal decisions made 16 years ago have proved as short-sighted.
Perhaps the most crucial decision was the 1966 Defence Review
when Mr. Denis Healey decided to rob the Royal Navy of its next
generation of aircraft carriers. This means that the Navy no
longer has Phantom interceptors which would have provided a fully
effective air defence over the Falklands. Even more crucial was
the loss of the Gannet airborne early warning aircraft.
Even if the Gannet squadrons still existed the plane could not
fly off the Invincible or Hermes, as neither ship has a catapult
or arrestor wires. To make matters worse the new surface war
ships ordered after 1966 Defence Review were deliberately made
smaller in size to appease the Treasury. The Sheffield and her
nine sisters were cut down in length by 30 feet, making it impos
sible to give them a Seawolf missile system or the latest missile
detecting radar.
The sad fact is that four years ago the Royal Navy was better
suited to dealing with the sort of war which has broken out so
suddenly in the Falklands. Its mixture of aircraft carriers and
anti-submarine escorts gave it the degree of flexibility which
has been steadily eroded. Had General Galtieri waited another
six months the Invincible and Hermes would have been sold and the
fleet could not even have contemplated action in the Falklands.
It was four years ago that the Royal Navy got rid of its big carrier, the
Ark Royal. It was the only carrier which could have launched planes carry
ing the AEW (Airborne Early Warning) system. To substitute for this early
warning weakness, Task Force Counsellor, John "Sandy" Woodward has had to
station his under-armed, exposed destroyers at some distance on so-called
"picket duty." Instead, it's the destroyers which are being picked off.
British officials are deeply concerned that Argentina, down to its last
known Exocet missile, may be close to obtaining at least four more from that
champion of world "liberation," Colonel Kadafi of Libya.