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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, MAY 14, 1982
PAGE 9
The TIME article then reviews the first-in-combat use of other deadly
weapons--the British Sea Skua and Seawolf missiles and the now infamous
French-made Exocet missile-
.�-
The French developers of the Super Etendard
Fighter and Exocet missiles, which combined to sink the H.M.S. Sheffield,
� said to have exulted openly about the "victory for French
electronics."
Then, too, is the expanded use of earth-orbiting satellites for military
intelligence. It has now been learned that it was a Russian satellite that
beamed to the Argentines the exposed position of the ill-fated H.M.S.
Sheffield.
Based upon this initial sighting, the Argentines further
refined the Sheffield's position via their own aerial reconnaissance air
craft, then sent the Etendard on its way. The whole process took about four
hours. Russian technical help thus proved extremely valuable.
The big question that the British have now is: where are those two German
made subs the Argentines have? The subs have modern torpedoes which could
deal a deadly blow to the converted liners carrying British troops--the
Canberra and the Queen Elizabeth
.1!•
Debate in Congress Over What Kind of Navy
Defense of surface naval vessels against such powerful offensive weapons is
becoming increasingly difficult. This difficulty is the prime reason for
the debate in the U.S. Congress over which way the U.S. Navy develops in the
future. Should the Navy deploy additional 90,000 ton 3.4 billion dollar
aircraft carriers, a policy advocated by the "big punch" school? Or should
it rely upon smaller carriers plus a larger number of smaller, more
maneuverable ships, a program pushed by the "dispersal school." The sink
ing of the Sheffield certainly- shows that small ships are vulnerable, but
those advocating smaller surface vessels point out the incalculable loss of
just one Nimitz class carrier, plus its load of 95 aircraft--some of them
costing about $25 million a piece--to say nothing of a crew of 6,000
menl
In a special report entitled "Are Big Warships Doomed," NEWSWEEK magazine
(May 17, 1982 issue) says this:
A carrier task force is a strategic contradiction: an offensive
armada most of whose parts exist to defend itself ••.• Submarine
commanders who have tracked U.S. carriers during naval exercises
are almost contemptuous of their prey. Writing in the journal
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Comdr. John L. Ryron said that
the carriers' anti-submarine protection "often resembles Swiss
cheese."
Asked at a Congressional hearing how long U.S. nuclear-powered
carriers would last in an all-out war, retiring Adm. Hyman
Rickover answered bluntly: "About two days." The big carriers
are so open to attack that when_! show of U.S. power� called
for during the Iranian hostage crisis, the Navy refrained from
sending_! supercarrier into the Persian Gulf.
The remainder of the NEWSWEEK article shows how vulnerable the U.S. fleet
would be to a Soviet blue-ocean navy composed now of 1,179 ships, nearly
twice the number of the 600-ship Navy the Pentagon wants. Moscow's fleet
includes 375 submarines. In a battle near land the carrier task forces
would also be assaulted by waves of Soviet "Backfire" airplanes, each