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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, FEBRUARY 1, 1982
PAGE 12
the MiG-23 plane can be used as a attack fighterbomber. As such, it would
be capable of striking American East and Gulf Coast cities!
Such a deployment, of course, would be a clear violation of the 1962 post
Cuban Missile Crisis agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union where
by Moscow agreed not to station further "offensive" weapons in Cuba in
return for an American pledge not to overturn the Castro regime (as the U.S.,
had tried to do in the 1961 "Bay of Pigs" fiasco).
It now appears that Premier Nikita Khrushchev and not President John
Kennedy was the real--meaning long-term--winner of the so-called "Missiles
of October" confrontation.
An embarrassed Khrushchev lost the initial
skirmish, having little choice but to ship the weapons back home. However,
the future of Cuba's revolutionary government was assured, free to haunt a
weakened America in the years to come. The Communist Chinese, incidental
ly, refer to the missile crisis and its resultant "understanding" as the
"Caribbean Munich."
Over the years, Cuba's Fidel Castro--viewed in some Third World circles as
a kind of "Red Robin Hood" or a "Second Bolivar"--has been anxious to export
revolution throughout the Americas. Early attempts failed, culminating in
the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara in 1967.
American influence in the
region, moreover, was still too strong.
The Soviets were far more cautious than Castro all along, and still are.
They saw Central America as a vital sphere of U.S. interest, similar to
their own position in Eastern Europe. Throughout the 1960's and much of the
1970's the Kremlin, writes Soviet expert Jiri Valenta in the fall, 1981
issue of ORBIS, "continued to believe ••• that the United States had the
ability and will to challenge outright revolution in Central America."
This perception changed in the latter 1970's due to the humiliating defeat
of the U.S. in Vietnam (proseribing direct American military involvement
elsewhere, even closer to home), the relinquishing of the Canal Zone in
Panama, and indecisiveness with regard to the budding revolution in
Nicaragua.
The ever-cautious Soviets provided very limited direct support to the
Sandinista victory, choosing to get involved heavily after the Somoza gov
ernment's fall, cementing the Sandinista-Moscow ties with various economic,
technical and trade agreements. Sensing the opportunity, however, Moscow
has been much more involved at the ground level in leftist strategy in the
El Salvador war. (This revolution, as the experts say, is "less genuine"-
meaning that the majority of Salvadorans do not support it. The rebels
there have had to first create a "climate of revolution.")
In sum, the men in Moscow as well as Havana are clever opportunists, skill
ful at exploiting America's collapsing power and prestige in Central
America. The Kremlin is clever, too, to get other members of its worldwide
"socialist fraternity" to share in "the struggle." Now Yasser Arafat is
bragging that PLO pilots are flying jet fighters in Nicaragua.
Where--unless the U.S. stands up--will the radicalization stop?
Max
Single, deputy director of the Hudson Institute issues this somber warning: