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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, JANUARY 22, 1982
PAGE 10
Of bigger concern to Washington than the 30 Russian T-54 and T-55 tanks and
1,000 East German and Soviet military transport trucks is Nicaragua's ob
vious intent to become the region's unchallenged air power. Runways of at
least three Nicaraguan airports are being extended to a length where they
could accommodate, if necessary, advanced Soviet MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter
aircraft. The Nicaraguans now fly no MiGs, but from 12 to 18 older models
are expected soon. About 80 Nicaraguans have been sent to Bulgaria for
pilot training, presumably for handling the MiGs.
American officials are worried over the air force buildup for two reasons.
First of all is the intimidation impact on Nicaragua's neighbors. Notes
Major General William Masterson, deputy Commander-in-chief of the U.S.
Army's Southern Command in Panama: "A high-performance aircraft would make
a far greater impact psychologically than would a tank or armoured vehi
cles."
Secondly, advanced MiGs using runways in the heart of Central
America could strike at any target in the Caribbean region, including the
Panama Canal. Adds General Masterson: "I'd be forced to recommend that the
air defense system guarding the canal be greatly improved here."
Perhaps most galling of all (no play on words intended) is the fact that the
new Socialist government of France has agreed to sell $17.5 million worth
of "non-offensive" military equipment to the Sandinistas. The iterns in
clude two patrol boats, two helicopters and 15 trucks. Despite howls from
Washington, the government of Francois Mitterrand claims the sale will help
Nicaragua from being totally dependent upon the Soviet bloc for arms.
(French Socialists generally choose to overlook the "Russian connection" in
so-called wars of liberation.)
The United States has bent over backwards--to an embarrassing degree--to
temper the Marxist fervor of the Nicaraguan government. This has proved
futile. On a trip to Managua last August, Thomas Enders, assistant secre
tary of state for Latin American affairs, placed before the Sandinistas a
remarkable set of proposals, including a form of non-aggression pact and
assurances of control over Nicaraguan exile groups on U.S. soil--all in ex
change for a modification of the Sandinista regime's behavior.
The attempt failed. All the Nicaraguans did, complained one U.S. official
was "to make hostile gestures and to accelerate the process of radicaliza
tion."
The political momentum is clearly on the side of the Soviet/Cuban/Sandi
nista triumvirate. The United States is hamstrung at nearly every turn.
Washington has tried, to little avail, to solicit the help of the Mexican
government, hoping that its friendly ties to both Havana and Managua can
stem the tide.
Privately Mexico's leaders are deeply concerned about a Marxist tide sweep
ing up Central America to spill over into its strategic oil fields located
just north of Guatemala (which is also battling a growing leftist insur
gency). Publicly however, Mexico's leadership must maintain its distance
from Washington, to assuage "anti-Yanqui" sentiment. The Mexican media are
all too ready to repeat Cuban warnings that the U.S. is about to undertake
aggressive action in the Caribbean.
Mexico City dailies headlined the
Pentagon's creation of a new Caribbean military command as "U.S. Prepares
to Invade."