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PASTOR GENERAL
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S REPORT, JANUARY 15, 1982
PAGE 13
silence be perceived as condoning the Jeruzelski crackdown. His response
was to initiate--unilaterally--a series of sanctions against both the
Soviet Union and the martial law government in Poland. Western Europe has
since been dragged--very reluctantly--into supporting the U.S. sanctions
policy.
Mr. Reagan's announced sanctions, however, are more form than substance
unless or until he reimposes an embargo on grain sales to the Soviets-
fully three-fourths of U.S. sales are to the U.S.S.R.
West Germany's--and all of Western Europe
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s--trade stakes with the Soviets
and Eastern Europe are much higher. This is critical in these recessionary
times. Nearly a half million jobs in west Germany alone are dependent upon
East Bloc exports. The big steel firm of Mannesman, for example, sells al
most 60% of its steel tubing to the East--and this percentage will increase
if the massive $15 billion Soviet-Western Europe gas deal goes through.
These economic realities undoubtedly lay heavily on the mind of West German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as he gave his own perspective of events in
Poland--a view far different from that of Mr. Reagan. Mr. Schmidt told THE
NEW YORK TIMES:
I think that the sanctions, economically speaking, are not really
of great effect. But, of course, psychologically, politically,
they will have a great effect in Moscow....! consider Jeruzelski,
first of all, to act out of what he believes to be in the best of
interest of the Polish nation, in the first instance as a Pole.
In the second instance, he appears as a military man. And only in
the third instance, I think, he comes as a Communist.
Hardly the hard-line approach taken by Mr. Reagan.
Main Problem: U.S. Ambivalence
Chancellor Schmidt believes that the ambivalent American foreign policy in
recent years, following in the wake of the Vietnam experience, lies at the
heart of the crisis in the Western Alliance, not European softness.
During the Carter years, for example, washington turned a blind eye as
Moscow greatly expanded its medium range nuclear weapons targeted on West
ern Europe. Mr. Carter also canceled at the last minute--embarrassing his
NATO allies--key weapons programs to redress the growing imbalance. Mr.
Reagan's policy is the exact reverse of Mr. Carter
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s, but the key factor is
this: How is he perceived in the Kremlin?
Chancellor Schmidt has called for an early summit meeting between President
Reagan and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in order to, as he said, make
Brezhnev understand "the guts that are behind the American president."
"They underrate you," Schmidt said of the Soviet leadership's attitude
toward the United States.
"They underestimate you and this is a great
danger. It can lead to miscalculations which might spell danger for all of
us; for you as well as for us in West Europe, as well as for them."
Schmidt told an American television journalist that the Soviets have come
to question the continuity of goals and strategy of the United States. "The