Page 810 - Church of God Publications

Also much of the area is above

the 3,000-foot elevation mark,

provid ing cool temperatures for

ideal cultivation.

The French opium monopoly

began a campaign of inducing

these Hmong and Yao tribesmen

to expand areas of cultivation and

to increase production. French

colonial agents were sent out to

contact tribal leaders and nego–

tiate contracts for increased pro–

duction. In return for new quanti–

ties of raw opium, French author–

ities gave political support to

aggressive tribal leaders.

Production boomed and, conse–

quently, the opium monopoly

filled the vacuum created by the

war. At the same time an entirely

new chapter opened in the saga of

the opium poppy that would

prove to have far-reaching effects

on the whole world.

First lndochina Wa r

The First Indochina War proved

to be a costly and bitter lesson to

the French. French professional

soldiers considered it a war to be

fought in the traditional style.

Their Viet Minh communist

opponents saw it as an entirely dif–

ferent kind of war , a political war

for the control of the hearts and

minds of the people themselves.

Slowly, the French began to

realize that trad itional tactics

would not work in t his kind of

war. France knew it needed allies

among the people. They turned to

the ethnic minorities and reli–

gious factions to find these allies.

Among them were the opium–

producing Hmong of the high–

lands of

1

ndochina.

These hearty hillpeople proved

effective allies of the French in their

fight with the Viet Minh. At the

height of the First Indochina War,

as many as 40,000 mercenary

tribesmen were ambushing Viet

Minh supply lines and providing

intelligence. There was one catch:

for the French to ensure the loyalty

and livelihood of their mountain

allies, they had to see that the Laos

and Tonkin hill tribes ' majar cash

crop, opium, was purchased, deliv–

ered and sold to the ready market

through Hanoi , Saigon and on to

the outside world.

40

This proved to be a mutually

profitable agreement. T he French

had a highly effective counter–

insurgency unit operating under

the military's direct control. The

Hmong and Yao had a secure

market for their lucrative cash

crop. As well, profits from the

sale of the opium and heroin

could be used by the French mil–

itary commanders to finance their

mercenary units.

Dien Bien Phu brought an end

to this profitable arrangement.

But the pattern of cooperation in

the opium trade between a West–

ern army operating in Jndochina

and their hill-tribe mercenary

forces was soon to be repeated–

with even more devastating con–

sequences.

Second lndochlna War -the

Vie tnam Wa r

In the late J950s, Americans

gradually replaced the French as

advisers to the then-fledgling gov–

ernment of the Republic of Viet–

nam, popularly known as South

Vietnam. This involvement con–

tinued the overall U.S. policy of

halting the spread of communism

in Southeast Asia.

America became more and more

embroiled in the Vietnam conflict.

Relationships with the ethnic and

religious minority groups in both

Vietnam and Laos followed the pat–

tern already established by their

French fo rerunners.

U .S. Special Force teams

(Green Berets) were given the

responsibility of recruiting,

supplying and training hill-tribe

mercenary units t0 fight the com–

munist Viet Cong, justas the Red

Berets of the French had done

befare them.

Soon the Americans discovered

that any viable relationship with

the H mong and Yao hill tribes

was always tied to the opium

trade.

The hearty Hmong hill man

was the ideal guerrilla in what

would once again prove to be a

guerrilla war. He lived simply,

led a spartan life, knew the ter–

rain and was a good fighter.

U.S. Special Forces personnel

soon learned respect and appre–

ciation for the severa! abilities of

these simple mountain folk. The

basic problem was they needed to

eat too, and opium was tradition–

ally their chief cash crop. Conse–

quently, the Americans replaced

the French in assuming the

responsibility of purchasing and

transporting the deadly product

of their mountain allies to the

markets of Southeast Asia's capi–

tals. Opium from as far away as

the Shan states in Burma found

its way by way of American

transport to drug trafficking cen–

ters and heroin factories.

What is the legacy of this

arrangement? Appalling.

Northern Thailand became a

center for opium smuggling and

heroin production. Motivated by

the

geL

principie, corrupt officials

in all the countries involved in the

war grew fat from the profits of

the illicit narcotics trade. New

and highly lucrative smuggl ing

routes or connect ions sprang up

everywhere.

Saigon became one of the

major centers of the trafficking of

drugs in Southeast Asia. Heroin,

morphine and opium were readily

available at inexpensive prices.

This had a spinoff effect (asirle

from increased flow of heroin to

the United States) that has had a

far-reaching and powerful impact

on the attitudes of American

youths toward the sale and use of

illicit narcotic drugs.

American GIs in Vietnam dis–

covered that the heroin and