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ernments. Chi le's lcade rs today
stress that it was
política/ mis–
management for more than three
decades before 1970
that was
respons ible for bringi ng C hile to
the sad state of affairs whereby a
Ma rxist could cven be eleeted as
a minority president.
This was part icularly the case
during the Chris t ian Democratic
adminis tration of Eduardo Freí
that ruled from 1964 to 1970.
Frei 's radi cal reform policies not
only angered traditional busi ness
interes ts, but, as importantly,
alienated much of Chile's formid–
abl e middle c lass, which had
grown great ly in number dur ing
the 20th century.
lt was t he middle class, not t he
rich, of which there are few in
Chile, which had borne the brunt
of the cconomic reforms that had
ncver worked. As a result , the
nation's economy remained stag–
nant for 40 years.
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nstead of reversi ng past poii–
cies, Alle nde instead toók them to
new ex tremes, with disastrous
consequences. Allende's regime,
in effect, proved to be the prover–
bial st raw that broke Chile's
back.
Chaos and " Kitchen Revolts"
Through the 1,000 turbulent days
along thc rocky path of Allende's
" road tosocialism," Chilean society
became increasingly polar ized be–
tween thc government 's supporters
and it s vchcment opponen ts–
clearly thc majority of Ch il e's t hcn
1
O
mi Il ion people.
By the s ummer of 1973 ,
Chi lc's cconomy was careening
toward complete collapse.
1
nfla–
tion was ragi ng well over 400 per–
cent a yea r. Foreign reserves–
which s tood at $345 million when
Allende took o ffi ce- had van–
is he d . l nstead, foreig n de bt
zoomed .
Agricultura! production nose–
dived as a result of continued
expropriation of prívate farms,
often at gunpoint by extremist
vigilantes, whose illegal activities
were condoned , if not approved,
by the government.
Commerce and industry was at
a s tandst ill. Most o f the 500 firms
nationalized- or "intervened," to
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use t he Chilean expression- we re
running up huge losses. (Pursu–
ing his goal of total s tatc control
and power, Allende had used
legal loopholes in the law to issue
decrees to take ove r prívate
industry.)
The prívate sector , meanwhile,
reduced to a mere one quarter of
t he economy, was hamst rung by
governmental ed icts. Many busi–
nesses simply shut down, rathcr
than operate in the red.
Chile's social fabric was unrav–
eling under the economic s train.
Polit ical assassination, sabotage,
running street battles between
left ists and r ight is ts- all these
were t he order of t he day.
Lines for rat ioned food sup–
plies- which never existed bcfore
Allende's rule- grew longcr as
agr icu ltura! output s lowed to a
halt, compounded by a nation–
wide trucking strike. T he black
market flourished , but the poor
couldn't afford the high pr iccs.
T he housewives of Santi ago,
infu riated by chronic sho rtages,
staged periodic " kitc hen revolts."
A signal would begin somewhere
in a neighborhood , and before
long the sound of spoons banging
on empty pots would fill the city
from one end to the other in a
Klaxon-like crescendo of protes t.
Internationally, Chile was veer–
ing dangerous ly toward the Com–
munist camp. T he United States
origi nally viewed Allende's exper–
iment with guarded optim ism.
Washi ngton offercd considerable
monet ary aid in an attempt to
encourage him from going too far
to the left .
T his offer was withdrawn when
Allende expropriated sorne U.S.–
owned copper mines without
compensation, justifyi ng his ac–
tion by claiming that the owners
had a lread y t a kc n excess ive
wealth o ut of the countr y.
Strained ties betwcen Washing–
to n and Santiago, in turn ,
increased the Allende govern–
ment's reliance on the Soviet
Union and Cuba.
The Last Days
By early September, 1973, Chile
was virtuall y without food. Nochi ld
had been to school for two months
because of strikes by teachers and
transport workers. Armed factions
in the country were only a trigger
squeeze away from igniting an all–
out civil war.
Perhaps most alarming of a ll
was the rumor that the ext reme
left, backed by a terrorist army of
14,000 foreign nationals (includ–
ing Cubans a nd various South
America n " urban" guerrillas),
was preparing for a total takeover
within the month. More than 200
key civilian and military figures
were believed targeted for execu–
tion in the so-called Plan Z.
(Huge stoeks of smuggled-in
weapons were subsequent ly un–
eovercd- even in t he two presi–
dential residences.)
Chi le's mil itary, unlike in other
countrics of South America, had
evolvcd a long tradition of non–
involvement in politics a nd of
subordination to civilian authori–
t y. The military had even
responded to Allende's numerous
calls to pul down civil unrest.
As the summer of 1973 d rew
on, however , the leaders of the
armed forces reluetantly reached
the conclusion that the only alter–
native to either civil war or out–
right Communist r ule, Cuban
st yle, was Allende's departu rc.
On September 11, 1973, the
commanders of the army, navy,
air force and national police joint–
ly execu ted Operation Cochayuyo
(seaweed). Surroundi ng the pres–
ident ial palace, La Mondeda (t he
old mint), t he units ordered Pres–
ident Allende to resign his office.
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n return he was offered safe con–
duct out of t he country.
Allende and armed supporters
in the palaee chose instead to
fight. The besieged pres ident
reportedly told a follower , " T hey
will only take me out of here
dead"- which happened four
hours after the s iege began.
T hough controversy surrounds
the exact nat u re of his death,
Allende is believed to have taken his
own life with a small maehinegun.
Significantly,
P/aín Truth
Edi–
tor in Chief Herbert W. Arm–
s trong had been in Santiago three
weeks before A llende's tragie
e nd . Mr. Armstrong, who has
(Cominued on page 41 )
The
PLAIN TRUTH