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alliance. Turkey's armed forces
ca rne to depend totally on U.S .
supplies and know-how.
Ankara has remained suspi–
cious of the Kremlin's ultimate
designs on Turkey. Many Turks
feel the Soviet Union's primary
objective with regard to their
country-control over the Bospo–
rus-Dardanelles waterway- has
not changed. Only her tactics for
achieving it have shifted.
Shaky U.S.-Turkish Ties
Now look at Turkey's army.
Turkey' s military force of
500 ,000 men- the largest in
Western Europe-is unquestion–
ably well-trained. In addition, the
country has the capability to
mobili ze up to four million
reservists should war break out.
The problem, however, is that
Turkey's army is equipped with
largely obsolete weapons. U .S .
officia ls have estimated that
nearly 50 percent of Turkey' s
milita ry equipment is badly in
need of repair.
As Ankara sees it, much of the
reason for this sorry state of
affairs líes in Washington, D.C.
Congress cut off arms aid to
Turkey in 1975 after Ankara
used American weapons in its
intervention in Cyprus. In reta l–
iation, Turkey closed down sorne
26 U.S . bases in the country,
including sensitive listening posts
which eavesdropped on the south–
ern Soviet Union.
Despite the continuing stale–
mate between Greece and Turkey
over Cyprus, the arms embargo
on Turkey was finally lifted in
the summer of 1978. The United
States resumed operating many
of its installations provisionally,
while negotiating for an agree–
ment on their extended use.
But for Turkey's armed forces,
nearly four years of embargo had
taken a heavy toll. Consequently,
Turkey has linked continued
American use of the installations
with demands for economic aid
and military equipment. Ankara is
anxious to make up for the lost
time in the modernization of its
military forces. But the country
June/ July 1980
~
MEOITERRANEAN SEA
has neither the cash nor the credit
standing to catch up on its own .
The Soviet military interven–
tion in Afghanistan has put new
life into the difficult negotiations
to repair damaged U.S. -Turkish
relations. Washington is now put–
ting renewed stress on closer ties
to its strategic NATO ally. The
emphasis is on s tronger mi litary
ties and the strengthening of Tur–
key's armed forces.
Direct Attack Unlikely
No one at the moment is predict–
ing an imminent invasion of Tur–
key by the Soviet Union. An
attack on Turkey , a NATO
member, would automatically
subject Moscow to armed retalia–
tion by other NATO members–
in theory, at least.
Moreover, the Turks a re a
tough, proud and fiercel y inde–
pendent people. lf the Soviets
were surprised at the resistance
they encountered in supporting a
tottering procommunist govern–
ment in Afghanistan , they would
surely discover they had an even
bigger tiger by the tail were they
to confront Turkey militarily.
The real threat to Turkey at
the moment is from its own inter–
na! crises. Mounting interna!
pressures, observers feel , might
well lead to disintegration of the
USSR
Ankarae
TURKEY
country- possibly via a full-scale
genera l re be llion . Ominous ly,
Turkey's giant neighbor to the
north would be waiting just next
door to pick up the pieces.
T here is evidence that this may
be just what is being planned.
According to Turkish intelligence
sources, the Kremlin is alreaqy
deeply involved in propaganda
efforts in support of procommu–
nists within Turkey. Of greatest
concern to autho rities at the
moment is increasing Soviet sup–
port of the troublesome Kurdish
separatist movement.
" Mountaln Turks"
Turkey's 44 million people are
relatively homogeneous-with
one exception. There are about 5
million Indo-European speaking
Kurds who live in eastern Turkey
along the border with Iran, Iraq
and Syria. The Kurds are offi–
cially called "Mountain Turks"
by the Ankara government, an
obvious attempt to avoid classify–
ing them as a separate ethnic
group.
Turkey 's Kurds have long
sought political .unity with fellow
Kurds inhabiting the f rontier
regions of bordering nations. A
revival of Kurdish nationalism in
eastern Turkey is now being
(Continued on page 38)
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