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the separatists who abused his re–
form program. Their movement col–
lapsed rather ignominiously. Then he
shrewdly turned his aim on pro–
Soviet sympathizers who thought
they could take advantage of the
crackdown from the center. He thus
used the occasion to weed out neo–
Stalinists as well.
Tito's ability to stamp out dissen–
sions was in evidence again last year.
In the aftermath of the Iranian revo–
lution, religious nationalism ftared
up among the nearly two million
Moslems in Bosnia. The problem
became so serious that Tito was
forced to travel to the republic to tell
certain Islamic clerics that their divi–
siveness would not be tolerated .
There is much truth to the often–
used expression that Tito was the
"only true Yugoslav." (Sorne cynics
say he was the first and
/ast
Yugo–
slav.) Tito (whose father was a
Croat , bis mother a Slovene) without
fail positioned himself above the
often contentious nationalisms and
interests in the nation. His unique
ability to fi rmly intervene at crucial
junctures could be sorely missed in
the future.
Tito has left no designated heir. As
part of his reform package, he
arranged for a collective system for
both the presidency and the party
leadership. Both agencies are ca reful–
ly tuned to the country's "ethnic key."
The government is now run by an
eight-man state presidency, with one
representative from each republic
plus the two autonomous regions.
The head-of-state position revolves
annually among the eight representa–
tives.
Yugoslavs believe-or have to
believe- that the somewhat awk–
ward arrangement wi ll work.
lf
it
doesn' t succeed, one Yugoslav offi–
cia l admits, "the country wouldn' t
survive five minutes."
Shockwaves for NATO
lt is felt by most experts that instead
of an outright attack, the Soviets
would resort to a divide-and-conquer
" Balkanization" strategy- to play
upon rival nationalisms, perhaps to
subvert one major group or republic.
(The Soviets are known to have
extended support to old Ustashi ele–
ments in exile.)
. Then in the wake of Soviet-
44
inspired chaos, sorne pro-Moscow
"centralist" hardliner could rise from
the midst and issue, as in the case of
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, an
urgent appeal for the Red Army to
come in and restore order.
Either way, Moscow's ultimate
ambition is to galn land access to the
AdriaticfMediterranean Sea region.
Soviet occupation of even a part of
Yugoslavia would be a calamity far
exceeding the Afghanistan takeover.
Soviet submarine bases on the
Adriatic and the stationing of War–
saw Pact troops directly across the
border from NATO Ita!y would send
shockwaves throughout all Europe.
The entire structure of postwar
Europe would change over.night.
Closer Tles Wlth West Essentlal
Because of this latent danger, Yugo–
slav and Western officials alike say
that a stronger economic relationship
with the West is likely the best
strategy for preserving the polyglot
Balkan nation's independence.
Since the break with Stalin, Yugo–
slavia's leaders have tried hard to
balance the country's trade between
East and West. Generally they have
succeeded. Presently, about 40 per–
cent of Yugoslavia's trade is with the
Soviet bloc whereas nearly one half is
with the West (the remainder is with
the Third World). West Germany is
Yugoslavia's biggest non-communist
trade partner.
Trade with the West has helped to
liberalize Yugoslavia politically over
the years. Unlike other East Euro–
peans, Yugoslavs can travel freely.
About 600,000 of them hold jobs
outside the country, primarily in
West Germany.
In the wake of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan and Tito's illness the
Common Market stepped up trade
negotiations with the Yugoslavs that
had dragged on for two years. A new
preferential agreement tentatively
agreed upon would give Yugoslavia a
status equivalent to an associate
. membership in the Market.
A deepening economic tie-in to
Western Europe, with new markets
for her goods, might aid Yugoslavia
in tackling its other severe economic
problems, such as 720,000 unem–
ployed, a 30 percent inftation rate
and a growing debt burden to West–
ern banks.
Because of his own ideological
background, Tito could not push
Yugoslavia further toward the capi–
talist west. For national security he
relied upon Yugoslavia's own nation–
al defense, coupled with ties to the
"non-a ligned" bloc- increasingly a
weak reed .
One of Tito's long time political
foes, Milovan Djilas, calls reliance
upon the nonaligned world "unrealis–
tic." In the futu re, says Dijlas, Yugo–
slavia has only two choices: interna!
chaos and isolation or "gradual ...
linkage of its independence to West-
ern Europe .. . Hence, Yugoslavia
will have to . .. open itself to the
West . .. [to] assure its survival."
European Power Bloc t o Arlse
Yugoslavia's future will be played
out against the entire backdrop of
world events unfolding today, specifi–
cally, the decline of American power
and the need of U.S. allies to look
after their own interests.
Bible prophecy reveals there will
soon arise a 10-nation power bloc in
Europe to challenge Soviet power.
Religion will play a vital-if not
pivotal- role. Moscow's growing
problems in Afghanistan, coupled
with Yugoslavia moving westward
could have an electrifying impact on
all of Eastern Europe.
The Soviets have clearly mis–
judged the fierceness of Afghan
opposition. Soon they may have to
pour 400,000 men into what could be
a sinkhole. Yet Moscow can't afford
to Jet its puppet socialist government
collapse. That would set a dangerous
preceden
t.
What if Catholics throughout
Eastern Europe, responding to the
Soviet dilemma, rose up in a united
revolt against Moscow? What could
the Soviets, tied down in Afghanis–
tan, do? The potential is there; wit–
ness Pope John Paul II's electrifying
visit to Poland last year.
The Vatican's renewed desire to
unite the Roman Catholic with the
Orthodox churches--even extending
overtures to the Moslem world- in a
united front against atheistic com–
munism could bave a particularly
interesting application in Yugoslavia,
given its religious makeup.
Europe- both in its eastern and
western halves--<:ould be in for
tumultuous change. o
The PLAIN TRUTH