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pers istence in pu rsuing costly
socialist programs.
I t may indeed have been "Mr.
Reagan's summit." For the first
time, the U.S. ch ief executive
found a healthy majority of support
for his policies, on economic issues
especially, as well as on the broader
range of East-West political and
security
r~lations.
Key: Confldence In Amerlca
Viewing the activities of this
annual "summit of summits" {this
writer's fourth such conference),
one thing was evident: Just how
important
confidence in America
is
to the stabi lity of the entire West–
ern World .
This was amply demonstrated by
the attempt on the part of the
Soviet Union, just as the summit
began, to rattle those in attendance.
Moscow warned that if the new
Pershing 11 and cruise missiles
were indeed deployed in Western
Europe beginning at the end of
1983, it might feel compelled to
move par t of its own Euromissi le
nuclear force forward into sorne of
its East bloc satellite count ries.
The Kremlin threat backfired.
In an unprecedented show of sol–
idarity, the eight assembled lead–
ers (the Common Market presi–
dent also attends) unanimously
vowed support for the NATO
deployment program. The una–
nimity was al l the more surprising
cons idering it entail ed support
from non-NATO Japan and from
France, which maintains a sepa–
rate defense structure and partici-
pates with the alliance only on
political matters.
Superficial Unlty
Behind the smiles and the optimis–
tic joint statements arrived at in
Williamsburg, however, are serious
and widening differences,
only papered over for now
in the pastel bloom of
economic recove r y. A
serious rift between the
United States and he r
allies is only a matter of
time.
Befare the conference,
1
had the oppor tunity of
talking to severa! foreign
relations experts in three
of the many "thi n k
tanks" headquartered in
Washington, D.C. The
upshot of their comments
to me: Watch out for the
next few months!
Manfred Hamm, a West Ger–
man defense expert with the Heri–
tage Foundation, related the over–
riding
política/,
rather than mili–
tary importance of the 1979
NATO decision to proceed with
new U .S.-made weapons stationed
The fabric of Euro–
pean-American relations
could well be ripped asun–
der over the issues of mis–
siles in Europe and the
deepening U .S. involve–
ment in Central Ameri–
ca-an area of the world
that most Europeans view
with far less alarm than
does the administration in
Washington.
Troops in 18th-century uniform parade before
President Reagan and President Francois Mitterrand
of France during opening ceremonie8.
At the Center of Strategic and
lnternational Studies (CS lS), de–
fense analyst Mike Moodie told me
that nearly all likely developments
in the controversia! Euromissile
deployment program bode ill for
the Westero alliance.
A less than unanimous
decision on the par t of
NATO's 16 members to
proceed with deployment
as scheduled would not
set well with the United
States. A decision to post–
pone t he deployment–
advocated by sorne Euro–
peans- would be consid–
ered even worse.
Leaders of tbe major
industrial democracies
com·ene, in final sessioo,
before sorne of tbe 3,000
journalists and
pbotograpbers in William
and Mary Hall.
on European soi l to counterbalance
the growing Soviet Euromissile
force.
- The West Germans, in particu–
lar, are fearful of Europe being
"decoupl ed" from the United
States on strategic matters. At
fi rst, consideration was given to
placing the new weapons aboard
submarines offshore of Western
Europe. But the Germans felt this
plan gave insufficient visibil ity to
the American commitment.
Now, should Europeans waver
on implementing the NATO game
plan, said Mr. Hamm, the Uni ted
States would certainly be justified
in considering the ul timate removal
of its ground forces from Europe,
rather than exposing them to
greater Soviet risk.
At the same time, observed Mr.
Hamm, the Europeans are deeply
concerned that tbe intercontinental
strategic (U.S. - rather than Euro–
pean-based) nuclear weapons that
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