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Communist underground between
the wars.
Both during and immedi ately after
the Second World War, T ito re–
mained totally loyal to Moscow. The
men in the Kremlin, however, never
quite trusted him and his hero-status
within Yugoslavia.
The crunch carne in 1948. Stalin
wanted lo replace T ito a nd his imme–
diate subordinates with men more
subservient to his wishes, like those in
the rest of Eastern Europe.
Stalin's mistake was in thinking
that it would be a relatively easy
matter to get rid of T ito.
"lt
will be
enough for me," said Stalin, "to
move my little finger and T ito will no
longer exist. He will fa ll. " (One
British source said that Stalin made
at least 30 a ttempts to have Tito
assassina ted!)
The Soviets put the Yugoslav lead–
ership to the test. Stalin demanded
that the Yugoslavs merge with neigh–
boring pro-Soviet Bulgaria to form a
new federation-with a Bulgarian
becoming the prime minister. Tito
Hatl y rej ected the idea. His colleagues
and countrymen rallied to his support.
The " unbreakable bonds" suppos–
edly linking the Soviet Union with
Yugoslavia were thus rent asunder.
The Yugos lavia n party was excom–
municated from the internationa l
communis t movement.
lndependent Road to Sociallsm
The Belgrade-Moscow rift was par–
tially hea led in the mid-1950s after
Stalin's death. New Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev, riding thecrest of
ant i-Stalinism, went lo Belgrade in
1955. He publicly apologized for Sta–
lin's earlier actions. But things were
never to be the same. The Yugoslavs
were well on their way toward con–
st r ucting their own independent road
to socialism. Over the years the two
approaches to communism have be–
come radi cal!y ditfercnt.
To the men of the Kremlin, the
Yugoslavian way to socialism–
which they denounce as " Titoism"–
sets a bad example for the rest of
Eastern Europe. Belgrade' s decen–
tralized, profit-motivated , " worker
self-management" system is in the
Kremlin 's eyes, sheer heresy, closer
to capitalism th a n communi sm
(though the Yugoslav state still owns
all enterprises).
Apríl 1980
Under self-managemenl, in-plant
worker's councils direct production
every step of the way. The goal of
every enterprise is to make a profi t–
not just to fulfill quantitative produc–
tion goals. Various state enterprises
even compete against each other.
Advertising is liberally employed.
Politically, Yugoslavia's leaders
insis t that there a re many ways to
communism . Each communist party
not only has the right to be indepen–
dent , they claim, but to shape its
society according to its own- not
Moscow's-interpretation of Marx–
ist-Leninist principies. The politica l
disease of "T itoism" has spread to
neighboring Romanía, which also
thumbs its nose a t Moscow in many
a rcas of policy.
In its foreign relations Yugoslavia
has pursued a neutral course. Presi–
dent Tito, in fact, was a fou nding
fath er of the nona ligned movement
begun in 1961. Nonalignment con–
sisted primarily of cultivating the
friendship of the scores of T hird
World nations uncommitted to either
Washington or Moscow.
Largely in the cause of nonalign–
ment , Tito became one of the most
traveled sta tesmen in the world,
visiting more than
lOO
countries.
One of his last trips, however, was an
unpleasant one. Though ill , he Hew to
the nonaligned conference in Ha–
vana, Cuba, las t year, where he
pulled the plug on Fidel Castro's
attempt to realign the nonaligned
world with Moscow.
Yugoslavs Would Fight
Because of Yugoslavia's "bad exam–
ple" the view prevails in ma ny circles
that someday the Soviet Union must
attempt to pul a n end to the Yugo–
slav "experimcnt."
Mos t political a nalysts do not
believe that the Kremlin would be so
bold as to invade post-T ito Yugosla–
via outright. Yugoslavia is certainly
no pushover. Calling his country "an
invincible bastion" T ito developed
the concept of " total national de–
fense." Standing in the first line of
march is the well-trained 270,000-
man Yugoslav Peopl e's Army ,
backed up by 500,000 reservists.
Behind the regular forces, a nation–
al militia of perhaps as many as four ·
million men and women is prepared
for backup defense. T he militia-
ca lled the "a ll people's na ti onal
defense"- is intended to take defen–
sive advantage of Yugoslavia 's moun–
tai nous terrain, utili zing the tact ics of
the World War
JI
partisans.
Because of its gcography, Yugo–
slavia remains milita rily vulnerable.
Belgrade is only 100 miles from the
Hungarian border across which the
Soviets have posi t ioned a huge tank
strike force. Nevertheless, Yugoslav
defense experts are encouraged by
two factors.
First, both they and the Soviets
know an attack on Yugos lavia would
mean World War 11 1. Tha t 's the last
thing Moscow wants now.
Secondly, the Soviet incursion into
backward Afghanistan is causi ng
Moscow much more difficulty than
origina lly anticipatcd. An a ttack on
Yugoslavia - an infinitely tougher
foe- is out of the question .
Yugoslavla's Greatest Weakness
Moscow would likely choose another
route to bring Yugoslavia to heel
that of subversion . Here there is
fertile soil to work in, fo r Yugosla–
via 's greatest weakness is its suscepti–
bil ity to interna! division.
Yugoslavia (which means ··south
Slavic sta te" ) only da tes to 1918 .
Within its complex a nd fragile feder–
al framework a re con tained s ix
republics, two a utonomous regions,
six official nationalities (plus severa!
smaller ethnic groups) , three major
religions- a nd even two alphabets.
By official definition, there is no
single Yugos lav nationality. What
primari ly unites the va rious Yugo–
slav peoples is th eir commonly
sha red one-party política! and social
sys tem- plus fea r of a common
adversary. Ever-increasing prosperi–
ty under self-man agement also is a
unifying factor, though much re–
ma ins to bring the southern half of
the country up to the standa rd of
living of the developed north. There
is little else Yugoslavs have in com–
mon. Thei r histories, on the other
hand, divide them.
T he republics of Scrbia, Montene–
gro and Macedonia, for example,
have traditionally been eastwa rd–
oriented. Their religious background
is predomi nately Eastern Orthodox.
Croat ia and S lovenia , on t he other
hand, have tradit ionally looked west-
(Continued on page 43)
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