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4
YEARLY
MIUTARY
EXPI!NDITURES
SELECTED
COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
UNITEO STATES
CHINA (PRC)
GERMANY (WEST)
FRANCE
UNITED KINGDOM
SAUDI ARABIA
JAPAN
POLAND
ITALY
GERMANY (EAST)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
ISRAEL
CANADA
ROMANIA
INDIA
BELGIUM
SWEDEN
AUSTRALIA
IRAO
NORWAY
SYRIA
SWITZERLAND
EGYPT
ARGENTINA
NIGERIA
PHILIPPINES
ZIMBABWE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
All data trom 1979.
Source:
WorldMllltary Expendltuf'H and
Arma
Transtera 197D-1979
publlahed
by
U.S.
Arms Control and Dlsarmament
Agency.All data trom
1979
flgureclln
constant 1978
u.s.
donara.
le
~~~-::J~IIze.
soring "wars of liberation" to
secure new allies of their own out–
sirle the U.S. ring of steel.
Departure With the Past
The real and perceived threats pre–
sented by American and Soviet
actions and reactions radically
altered usual post-war scenarios.
Instead of reducing manpower
and spending levels to "normal"
peacetime levels, neither the
United States nor the U.S.S.R. felt
they could afford to do so. Mistrust
was too strong.
In his book
Preparing For the
Next War
Micbael Sherry points
out that U.S. peacetime military
manpower increased from an aver–
age 275,000 men in pre-war years
to more than two million men after
the war. Peacetime spending soared
from pre-war levels of no more
than $650 million a year to more
than $80 billion (thousand million)
by the early ' 70s. It reached a stag–
gering $120 billion in 1979.
Neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union wanted a direct
confrontation. Both sides, there–
fore, began a kind of war by proxy,
winning allies, extending influence
and keeping up pressure on each
other by means of arms sales.
By the late 1960s, arms sales had
become an integral part of the for–
eign policies of both sides.
From 1960 to 1980, worldwide
military outlays grew from $100
bill ion to more than $500 billion a
year. That last figure is twice the
1981 gross national products of
Mexico, the entirety of Central
America and al! of the various Ca–
ribbean nations combined.
Nations are indeed often moti–
vated by fear of outside aggression.
For a number of nations, spending
levels reflect the
need
to maintain a
high leve! of military visibility to
keep the local population in line.
And for many, the
prestige
of hav–
ing expensive sabers to rattle is
enough reason to maintain a mili–
tary establishment.
Diplomats have expressed con–
cero about the sale of these weap–
ons. But very little has been done to
abate the flow of arms to even the
most volatile areas.
Arms sales are big business.
From 1975 to 1979, the five lead–
ing arms exporters- the United
States, the Soviet Union, France,
the United Kingdom and West
Germany-exported $66.7 billion
(constant '78) worth of arms to
clients around the world.
The Arms Merchants
From 1950 to 1979, the United
S tates transfer red $11 O billion
worth of arms and related s'ervices
to other nations. That was more
than half the world's total.
However; by the late '70s and
early '80s, with the U.S. restricting
its arms sales, the Soviet Union
overtook the United States to
become the biggest arms merchant.
From 1972 to 1981, the Soviets
delivered 74,000 major weapons
systems to its clients while the U.S.
delivered 44,000 systems.
Soviet deliveries included 23,250
surface-to-air missile systems,
3,705 supersonic aircraft and
13,220 self-propelled guns and
tanks.
U.S. deliveries included 8,890
surface-to-air missile systems,
1,540 supersonic aircraft and 7,440
self-propelled guns and tanks.
Even with all of this equipment
being sold, there was, nevertheless,
room for other producers to sell
their wares.
Under the guiding hand of the
Délégation Générale pour l'Arme–
ment (DGA), which oversees sales
and production nat ionwide, France
has become the world's third largest
arms salesman. From 1970 to 1980,
French arms sales increased fivefold.
This surge in French arms sales has
been in part because of France's
need to maintain a viable, indepen–
dent arms industry.
Sweden has come to face this
problem, but in a different way. The
Swedes are considering purchasing
from foreign sources rather tban
increasing exports just to maintain
arms industry independence.
An aggressive sales policy has giv–
en France a bad reputation. Andrew
J.
Pierre, author of
The Global Poli–
tics ofArms Sales,
puts it this way:
"Its [France's] arms sales policy
generally has been considered to be
the most permissive of the major
suppliers, with the assumption often
made that the French government is
willing to sell almost any weapon to
anybody" (page 83).
Britain, on the other hand, has
Thfl
PLAIN TRUTH