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U.S. trade fl.ow, two thirds of the
nation's oil imports and more than
half of the strategic minerals
brought into the United States
come through the Panama Canal
or the Gulf of Mexico.
The Presi–
dent pointed up that the United
States shares " a common dest iny"
with sorne two dozen nations that
rim the Gulf-Caribbean area,
which he termed the
"third bor–
der" of the United States.
Mr. Reagan coupled his econom–
ic package with a generalized warn–
ing to the Soviet Union and Cuba,
supporters of armed revolution in
the region, that the U .S. would "do
whatever is prudent and necessary
tQ ensure the peace and security of
the Caribbean area."
Others See lt Dlfferently
Reaction to Mr. Reagan's carrot–
and-stick speech spread across the
political spectrum.
The reaction throughout Latin
America was generally favorable.
Lesser developed economies saw
the prospect of increased export
opportunities. Jamaica's Prime
Minister Edward Seaga called the
plan "bold, historie, and far reach–
ing in concept." Mexico expressed
disappointment, since Cuba, with
which it enjoys good relations, was
excluded from the plan .
.
Other nations simply don't per–
ceive American anxieties in Central
America the same way at all. Of all
ten countries in the European Eco–
nomic Community, only Britain
sent observers to monitor El Sal–
vador's March 28 elections. The
others viewed the elections, in
which the leftist guerrillas chose
not to participate, as a farce.
In West Germany, the war in El
Salvador has whipped up passions,
especially among the young. A Ieft–
is t newspaper in West Berlín
claims it has collected more than
one million dollars to huy weapons
for the guerrillas battling the U.S.–
backed junta.
The most disturbing develop–
ment- to Washington- is the deci–
sion by France to sell $17.5 million
worth of non-offensive military
equipment to the Sandinista govern–
ment in Nicaragua which backs the
Salvadoran guerrillas. The Socialist
6
government of
Fran~is
Mitterrand
claims the sale will help Nicaragua
from being totally dependent upon
the Soviet bloc for arms.
It
is obvious that as the fighting
escalates in Central America, so
will the rift widen between the
United States and its Western
allies, already strained because of
the crisis in Poland.
America is widely perceived in
Western Europe as "backing the
wrong side" in Central America
and becoming enmeshed in "anoth–
er Vietnam." The Soviets, for their
pait, are doing their best to spl it
the NATO alliance over the issue.
Dellberate Plan
The nations of Central America–
primarily Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras and Nicaragua-haye
been aftlicted with more than the
usual share of economic dislocation
and political turmoil. For example,
Honduras, in its 161 years of inde–
pendence, has had 385 armed
rebellions, 126 governments and 16
constitutions!
Despite advances in r ecent
decades, poverty has been the sad
lot of the majority of the area's
inhabitants, especially the rural
peasant class. The derisive term
" banana republic" has described
the one crop (usually bananas or
coffee) economies that most of
these countries have had. The eco–
nomic fates of whole nations rose or
fell with world, and especial)y U .S.,
prices paid for these commodities.
Carlos Rangel , noted Venezue–
lan writer and author of the book
The Latín Americans,
takes due
note of Central America's chronic
instability, corruption, poverty, and
even pa5t U .S. policies. He warns,
however, in the June, 1981, issue of
Commentary
magazine:
"Communists and their sympa–
thizers must not be allowed to use
this sad truth to obscure the plain
fact that we are in the presence of a
deliberate and deadly threat to the
Western Hemisphere
in a region
which Soviet strategists have evi–
dently judged to be the soft under–
belly of the Americas."
Many fail to see-or choose to
ignore-this fact!
Over the years, Cuba's Fidel
Castro-viewed in sorne Third
World circles as a kind of Red
Robin Hood or a ..second
Bolívar"- had been anxious to
encourage revolution throughout
the Americas. Early attempts
failed, culminating in the death of
Ernesto "Ché" Guevara in 1967.
United States influence in the
region was still too strong.
The Soviets were far more cau–
tious than Fidel Castro all along, and
still are. They saw Central America
as a vital sphere of U .S. interest,
similar to their own position in East–
ern Europe. Throughout the 1960s
and much of the 1970s, the Kremlin,
writes Soviet expert Jiri Valenta in
the fall, 1981, issue of
Orbis,
"con–
tinued to believe ... that the United
States had the ability and will to
challenge outright revolution in
Central America."
This perception changed in the
latter 1970s because of the humil–
iating defeat of the United States
in Vietnam (proscribing direct
America n military involvement
elsewhere, even closer to borne),
the relinquishing of the Canal Zone
in Panama, and indecisiveness of
the Carter administr at ion with
regard to the budding revolution in
Nicaragua, which ultimately suc–
ceeded in the summer of 1979.
Thus, it has been the Soviet per–
ception of U .S. weakness more
than anything else that has pro–
pelled their drive right in Ameri–
ca's front yard. The Kremlin does
not believe that the United States,
even with the hard line administra–
tion of President Reagan, has the
will to do whatever it takes to pre–
vent the entire region from going
over to the Soviet side.
Bombers In Cuba
As if to prove their point, the
Soviets have recently shipped a
squadron of advanced MiG-23 war–
planes to Cuba. The planes arrived
in Cuban ports broken down in
crates. One version of the warplane
can be used as an attack fighter
bomber.
lt
would have a range
capable of st riking key American
East and Gulf Coast cities.
According to other intelligence
reports Cuhan airfields are also
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The PLAIN TRUTH